Philosophical Theories of Consciousness - Part V
Representational Theories
> Basic structure
> Mind is a "field" of internal representations
> Consciousness is a sub-field of these
> Which representations are conscious?
> depends on theories of
> representation
> function of consciousness
> type of RTC
Representational Theories
General Advantages
> phenomenological plausibility
> promising approach to qualia
> no need for mysterious intrinsic qualities of experience
> good reply to Nagel / Jackson worries
> potentially naturalizable
Naturalizing Intentionality I
> Naturalization of RTC depends on
naturalizing representation
> Can this be done ?
> Internalist vs. externalist accounts
> Is representation relational ?
> Possible externalist accounts
> causal history
> bio-semantics
Naturalizing Intentionality II
> Swampman
> Dretske's response
> Interpretationism to the rescue ?
> Not naturalizable ...
> Maybe internalism ?
> what is an "internalist semantics" ?
FOR vs. HOR
> HOR answers WHAT REPS question
> How: mechanism of higher-order takeup
> actual takeup vs. availability
> HOTs or HOEs
> the transparency of experience
> the transparency of introspection
Against HOT RTC
> Thoughts and concepts
> "theory of mind"
> Inflated conceptual demands
> Animal and infant consciousness
> Is HOT RTC too "introspectionist"
> transparency again
> consciousness vs. unconscious introspection
FOR's "What Rep" Problem
> What representations are conscious?
> Dretske
> Systemic vs. Acquired content
> Servicing acquired representations
> Not clearly aligned with consciousness
> Tye
> Poised content
> PANIC theory
> Aligned with consciousness ?
> Insect minds
> Unconscious effects on belief ?
A Nice Theory of Introspection
> Theory of mind / Folk Psychology
> Displaced perception analogy
> Concept application model
> Introspection explained
RTC is not Ontology
> more a "phenomenological" theory
> *IF* computational accounts of mental
representation are correct, *THEN*
RTC will fit with naturalized approach
> *IF* such accounts are flawed, RTC can
stand as an account of the structure
of consciousness
One Can Go Too Far
Dennett's RTC
> Pandemonium
> Cerebral celebrity
> = poised ?
> Color Phi and Verificationism
(See color phi here.)
> The elimination of experience
Consciousness and Information
> Is information a fundamental feature of
the world ?
> Spooky-action-at-a-distance
> Quantum necromancy
> Is there a link between information and
consciousness ?
> It from Bit ?
> does this idea need mind ?
Radical Approaches to Consciousness
> Consciousness as fundamental
> property dualism
> reformed matter
> panpsychism